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Chapter 13
Floridas Public Pension Reform Debate
A Discussion of the Issues and
Estimates of the Option Costs
Kenneth Trager, James Francis,
and Kevin SigRist
With assets approaching $100 billion, the Florida Retirement System (FRS)
is one of the largest pension plans in the United States. The FRS is com-
prised of nearly 800 employers and has approximately 600,000 active mem-
bers and 166,000 annuitants. l The Florida Division of Retirement handles
the administrative functions of the FRS, while the State Board of Adminis-
tration's (SBA) responsibilities include the investment of the pension trust
fund assets.
Two events transpired over the past year that heightened interest in the
costs and benefits associated with the FRS-the elimination of the FRS's un-
funded actuarial liability (UAL), and the introduction of optional defined
contribution (DC) pension plan legislation. The FRS returned to full fund-
ing status mainly due to the bull market in equities, the secular decline in
interest rates, and an aggressive asset allocation stance.2 The defined con-
tribution initiative arose primarily from public sector employer concerns
over its ability to compete with the private sector in attracting and retaining
workers (Bush 1999; Chiles 1999; Jennings, 1999).
In this chapter we focus on key elements of defined benefit (DB) and DC
pension plans that are at the heart of Florida's pension reform debate. We
then discuss goals and objectives of Florida's pension reform, including an
examination of the DB and DC benefit accrual patterns with a focus on rela-
tive benefit portability comparisons. A range ofpension reform option costs
is then presented. We conclude with an assessment of future public pension
reforms in Florida. Although we frame our remarks against the backdrop
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of FRS data, we believe the discussion is pertinent to all public or private
pension plans wrestling with pension reform issues.
Following the 1998 legislative session, Governor Lawton Chiles and the
Florida legislature impaneled the Unfunded Actuarial Liability Working
Group with a mandate to comprehensively study a number of pension
finance issues.3 The Working Group submitted its pension finance reform
proposals to the president of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and
the Board of Trustees of the SBA, and the recommendations were incorpo-
rated in the current actuarial valuation (UAL Working Group 1999; Milli-
man and Robertson, 1998a).4The consequent elimination ofthe UAL (a $3.8
billion surplus was posted on July 1, 1998) and more realistic wage growth
assumptions substantially reduced employer contribution costs. For the cur-
rent fiscal year, the FRS's composite contribution costs fell 611 basis points-
from 16.66 percent to 10.55 percent-translating into a systemwide budget
savings of approximately $1.1 billion.
Governor Chiles requested that the Working Group also address the vari-
ous pension reform issues circulating within the Legislature. The Working
Group's discussions emphasized the value of a more portable benefit struc-
ture, the need to enhance the fairness in the distribution of pension bene-
fits, and the lack of personal control of investment decisions present in all
defined benefit pension plans (self-determination). A series of optional DC
pension bills was introduced during the 1998 and 1999 Florida Legislative
sessions, each with the commonalties of holding FRS employees (existing
and future) and beneficiaries harmless while allowing workers to elect the
optional DC plan or remain in the DB plan.5
Defined Benefit Pension Concerns
Among the many advantages and disadvantages of DB pension plans, two
issues are central to the pension reform debate in Florida: the lack of self-
determination and portability losses.
DB plan participants currently have no investment options, but they bear
little investment risk. The lack of employee participation in DB investment
decisions coupled with the fact that employees are insulated from most in-
vestment risks appeals to plan members who value guaranteed retirement
benefits. But the rigidity of a DB plan's benefit structure and absence of em-
ployee choice has become an undesirable pension design element to a seg-
ment ofFRS employees. Increased interest in self-determination among this
segment of members has paralleled the extraordinary investment climate
since the end of the 1981-82 recession, a period associated with an elevated
rate of increase in stock prices and a secular decline in interest rates. The
period from 1994 through 1998 posted the highest five-year return for large
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company stocks in the 73-year history of the Ibbotson database (measured
by the S&P 500 Index; Ibbotson and Associates 1999).6
It appears that many self-determination advocates have unrealistically
high expectations of future investment returns because they extrapolate re-
turns using one of the strongest bull markets in U.S. history.? Since 1988,
FRS valuations assume an 8 percent investment return. While this is in step
with the majority of public pension plans, according to the Society of Actu-
aries (Samet, Peach, and Zorn 1996), assumed investment returns proved
well below those actually realized over this period. However, FRS member
benefits have only marginally participated in these excess returns.8 Instead,
excess returns have mainly been channeled into reducing employer (tax-
payer) costs that may have helped to fuel a desire for self-determination
among a segment of the FRS membership.
Ofcourse, there are no guarantees that historical financial market returns
will be sustained in the future; indeed the last I8-year period stands out be-
cause of atypically strong equity and bond market returns.9 And the desire
for self-determination among a segment of the FRS membership probably
goes beyond a discussion of financial market returns, since there always re-
mains the possibility that future DB benefits can be changed. There is some
risk that the legislature could change the forward looking benefit structure
of the FRS, which would negatively impact benefit accumulation; it is also
possible that the FRS might not continue its 3 percent cost-of-living adjust-
ment for retired beneficiaries. Some parallel might be drawn by looking at
the private sector, where conventional defined benefit plans are being con-
verted to cash balance plans, in some cases adversely impacting the benefits
of older, long service workers. In the case of the FRS, however, benefit re-
ductions are highly unlikely. The opening premise of Florida's VAL Working
Group formed in 1999 was that the benefits of existing FRS beneficiaries
and workers would always be protected.lO
A second perceived drawback of traditional DB plans pertains to porta-
bility losses, which affects workers with discontinuous work histories. This
is salient to shorter service employees who might leave FRS covered em-
ployment prior to the normal retirement age of 62. Some fraction of short
tenure could be voluntary, perhaps arising from opportunities in a dynamic
labor market or the desire to remain at home to raise a child. But in many
instances, short service is due to reasons that might deemed to be beyond
a worker's control, such as a layoff, a forced relocation, or the need to be a
caregiver for a parent with deteriorating health.
Workers who leave covered employment prior to meeting the FRS's ten-
year vesting requirement (which is double the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act's [ERISA's] maximum allowable cliffvesting in the private
sector) are the most visible example of FRS portability losses because they
leave with no retirement benefits (see Table 1). This group represents a non-
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TABLE 1. Employee Termination Counts by Years of Service, Florida Retirement
System
Years ofservice
<1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10-15
15-20
20-25
25-30
30 and over
Number ofemplo-yees
2,034
9,927
6,257
5,131
3,884
2,568
2,123
2,056
1,761
1,366
6,914
3,607
2,696
2,291
2,421
Percent of total
3.70
18.04
11.37
9.32
7.06
4.67
3.86
3.74
3.20
2.48
12.60
6.50
4.90
4.20
4.40
Cumulative percent
3.70
21.70
33.10
42.40
49.50
54.10
58.00
61.70
64.90
67.40
81.40
87.60
92.50
96.90
100.00
Source: Authors' calculations from unpublished 1997-98 data kindly provided by the Florida
Retirement System.
trivial number of workers; over two-thirds of the FRS workers who termi-
nated employment over the last actuarial valuation period (July 1997-June
1998) left public service prior to vesting and are entitled to no FRS pension
benefits. Some of these workers may eventually reenter FRS employment
later in their working careers, but the longitudinal data needed to estimate
this proportion is not available.
Another type of portability loss arises from the backloading of benefits
found in most traditional DB plan designs. In Florida, FRS public employee
benefits are based on the average of the highest five years ofearnings, which
typically occur at the end of a career, rather than lifetime earnings. Vested
workers who leave FRS employment prior to the normal retirement age of
62 will find that the purchasing power of their retirement benefits is eroded,
since the wage base is frozen in nominal terms. This can cause a substantial
portability loss, nearly double the portability loss of nonvested workers who
leave covered employment (Hay-Huggins and Mathematica Policy Research
1988).
Some skew in the distribution of pension benefits to reward long ser-
vice may be considered desirable, but DB portability losses also contain two
largely unintentional (and not mutually exclusive) components. First, the
level of inflation affects the portability loss in a DB plan-which, ofcourse, is
beyond the control ofemployers (Bodie, Marcus and Merton, 1985; Turner
1993). Second, "an age bias" is embedded in portability losses, since shorter-
term younger workers who lose benefits in effect transfer value to shorter-
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Figure 1. Distribution of FRS benefits for workers terminating employment with ten years of service. Source: au-
thors' compilations of FRS data (7/1997-6/1998).
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term older workers. The same can happen in the FRS formula. Figure 1 uses
FRS data from the 1998 actuarial valuation to highlight the bias present
for workers with ten years of service. Retirement benefits are computed for
workers entering covered employment at different ages with equivalent sal-
aries and ten years of service, relative to the benefits of a ten-year service,
equal salaried worker terminating employment at the normal retirement
age of age 62. The FRS's 6.25 percent salary growth assumption (which was
lowered substantially from 7.25 percent in the prior year's valuation) is em-
bedded for workers terminating employment prior to age 62.
The results show that a worker who terminates FRS employment at the age
of32, for example, receives only 16 percent of the pension benefits which an
older worker receives, who terminates employment at 62, even though both
workers had equivalent nominal salaries and years of service in the system.
From another perspective, the pension costs to taxpayers for older workers
are over six times that of younger workers hired (since all other variables
other than age are identical, both workers are assumed to contribute equal
amounts of public services). The age bias imbedded in the FRS penalizes
younger mobile workers, while giving disproportional pension benefits to
workers with equal years of service hired at older ages. Full-career employ-
ees fare relatively well in the current FRS, garnering benefits in excess of
what a cost-equivalent DC plan would provide. It has been shown that the
pension benefits of young, shorter service FRS workers are nearly 70 per-
cent lower than what they would receive under a cost-equivalent DC plan
(VAL Working Group 1999).H
Defined Contribution Pension Concerns
Although some groups of public sector employees are attracted by the self-
determination and portability of DC plans, other DC plan characteristics are
of concern to policymakers and some plan participants. These include the
lack of preretirement death and disability insurance, the need to embrace
investment risk to increase portability, the ease of preretirement lump-sum
distributions and possible increases in labor turnover associated with DC
plan portability.
As in most traditional DB plans, FRS benefits include preretirement death
and disability insurance. Although these insurance benefits are not typically
considered part ofa DC pension plan, it is considered desirable to continue
them, should optional DC pension plan legislation pass in Florida. The me-
chanics of assuring the continuation of these benefits are straightforward;
the FRS could simply deduct the cost of the death and disability benefits
(estimated to be from 50 to 100 basis points) from the DC plan's allocation.
Many workers are attracted to the portability and self-determination as-
pect of DC plans, but these plans also embody investment risks associated
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with investment decisions which will fail to appeal to all. DC plan benefits
are not guaranteed, and the risk-averse would gravitate toward the guaran-
teed benefits of DB plans, given the choice.The concern is that public sector
workers who take on investment risks in a DC plan might find their retire-
ment security adversely affected given a bad turn in the financial markets
near retirement age. Of course DC investment risk during the retirement
period could be mitigated if retirees could buy deferred annuities (Bodie,
Marcus, and Merton 1985; Turner 1993). On the other hand retirement in-
come security might be less due to the expenses associated with private an-
nuity markets.12 This in turn implies that plan participants will require ex-
tensive, and potentially expensive, financial education which would help
workers decide how to invest and how to structure pension payouts. We note
that the pension reform bill passed by the Florida Senate during the 1999
legislative session contained an educational program component.
A third type of portability loss occurs when workers cash out their pen-
sion as a lump-sum distribution, on leaving covered employment and prior
to normal retirement. (It would be more logical to roll over the assets over
into a qualified account, from a tax perspective.) The resulting erosion of re-
tirement savings is substantial and it affects younger and lower paid employ-
ees, as well as low-dollar accounts (Andrews 1985; Piacentini 1990; U.S. DoD
ERISA Advisory Council 1998). We also note that some DB plans permit
workers to cash out their accruals at termination; a study by Atkins (1986)
found that 40 percent of DB plans permitted this. During the 1999 Florida
legislative session, interest was expressed in allowing a transfer of the dis-
counted value of FRS benefits for terminated vested FRS members as part
of the pension reform package.
Permitting workers to cash out lump-sum distributions prior to retire-
ment reflects a tradeoff between the dual objectives of self-determination
and retirement benefit adequacy, that often imply the need for limitations
on preretirement distributions. The ERISA Advisory Council (1998), for ex-
ample, recommended that preretirement lump-sum distributions in excess
of $2,000 be rolled over into a qualified retirement savings vehicle, while
also allowing for hardship withdrawals. The President's Commission on Pen-
sion Policy (1981) recommended that any cashout of pension benefits over
$500 (approximately $900 in 1998 dollars) be prohibited unless it was trans-
ferred to an IRA or another qualified plan.
An additional concern to policymakers is the possibility that the increased
portability afforded workers in DC plans may increase labor turnover, raise
labor costs, and lower productivity. Employers often incur substantial train-
ing costs when hiring new employees and the reduced portability provisions
of DB plans could increase the likelihood of employers recouping these
training costs by offering a financial barrier to terminating employment.
While this may be true in some cases, evidence suggests only a modest turn-
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over disincentive of backloaded DB pension plans for short-term, recently
trained workers (Gustman and Steinmeier 1987, 1995).
Another side of the pension-portability relationship concerns older work-
ers. DB plans often seek to induce retirement at the so-called "normal" re-
tirement age, when pension accruals are typically maximized and produc-
tivity is expected to start declining (e.g., Bodie, Shoven, and Wise 1988;
Dorsey, 1995). However, this view has gained little currency in Florida; in-
deed, the FRS has moved in the opposite direction by providing additional
benefits to encourage workers to remain in the workforce beyond the nor-
mal retirement ageP These targeted benefits impact a small-but costly-
segment of FRS members and increase both the transfer of benefits from
shorter to longer service workers, and the age bias.
The economics literature offers several theories seeking to explain why
employers might want to use DB plans to deter mobility.14 But to date there
is no conclusive evidence of a portability-productivity link that would be
useful to Florida policymakers seeking to assess the cost implications ofpen-
sion reform (e.g., Dorsey 1987; Gustman and Mitchell 1992; Dorsey, Corn-
well, and Macpherson 1998).
Goals of Public Pension Reform in Florida
Florida's UAL Working Group recommended that any pension benefit re-
form changes the Legislature enacted should be paid for (funded) on an
actuarially sound basis. It was further recommended that in the course
of its pension benefit reform deliberations, the Legislature should thor-
oughly evaluate the costs and benefits ofeach alternative and determine the
most appropriate goal of pension benefit reform. To this end, a number of
pension reform goals were identified in testimony to the Florida Working
Group, including bolstering Florida's labor market competitiveness and in-
creasing the fairness in benefits between various groups of employees (UAL
Working Group 1999: 2).
A useful perspective for analyzing benefit fairness and portability is to
summarize DB and DC benefit accrual patterns graphically by years of ser-
vice. This approach collapses many variables into a two-dimensional plane,
necessitating the selection of a specific worker profile for illustrative pur-
poses. We show benefit accrual patterns for FRS regular service employees
who start their careers at age 32 with an entry salary of$32,OOO. The measure
of salary replacement used is the percent of average final compensation,
which the FRS defines as the average of a worker's top five years of salary
(typically salary at the end ofa worker's career). Due to the backloading of
FRS benefits and the presence of inflation, salary growth is assumed to grow
from termination through age 62 at the current FRS actuarial valuation's
6.25 percent salary growth assumption for vested workers leaving covered
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Figure 2. Benefit accrual by years ofadditional service. Source: authors' compilations of FRS data (7/1997-6/1998).
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employment prior to the normal retirement age. For these workers, the ver-
tical axis represents average future compensation.
In Figure 2, the 45-degree (proportional) line depicts the benefit accrual
line of a pension plan with full portability, where equal benefit treatment is
granted to workers entering and leaving the covered workforce with varying
years ofservice. In this case, a given percentage change in years ofservice re-
sults in an equal percent change in average final (or future) compensation;
career interruptions would have no bearing on benefit proportionality. Due
to the backloading of benefits, the FRS's current DB benefit accrual line de-
viates substantially from proportionality. FRS workers accumulate no bene-
fits up to their first ten years ofcovered employment, after which the benefit
accrual line becomes concave from above (over halfof the total benefits paid
to a career FRS employee are accumulated in the last ten years of service).
When considering moving to a DC plan, it is essential to investigate the
employer's position with respect to portability losses. That is, there is no in-
herent reason for an employer to have different portability provisions be-
tween DB and DC plans: rather, portability losses are determined by a plan's
accrual pattern (Bodie, Marcus, and Merton 1988). In practice, portability
losses can be eliminated or substantially reduced through two DB pension
reforms: accelerating the vesting requirements, or indexing the benefits of
workers who terminate employment before the normal retirement age of
62. And since high portability and age equivalence can hold in both DB and
DC plans, it is reasonable to compare DB and DC plans that are equivalent
along these dimensions, when assessing how an optional DC plan might af-
fect funding levels and the contribution rate structure.
DC plans typically have accelerated vesting and do not have backloaded
benefits. Providing faster vesting and higher benefits to shorter service em-
ployees through an optional DC plan are new benefits relative to the cur-
rent FRS structure and will add cost unless benefits are reduced for other
workers, or workers make the wrong decision in their pension plan elec-
tion. (Reducing FRS retirement benefits was never a point of discussion in
Florida.) Thus a reasonable benchmark for discussing pension reform op-
tions is to consider providing those same types of new benefits through re-
form of the FRS DB system. The two DB reforms suggested above will be
sequentially added to the DC/DB accrual analysis.
Simulations were run for a number of vesting schedules. A graded two-
to six-year vesting schedule (defined as 20 percent vesting after two years
of service, increasing in 20 percent increments per year through the sixth
year) was adopted in the Senate pension reform bill. The DC and DB pen-
sion plans contained identical vesting provisions (graded two- to six-year)
to avoid a two-tiered benefit structure so that FRS members would not be
forced into having to embrace a higher degree of investment risk in order
to achieve increased pension benefit portability. In addition, a graded two-
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to six-year vesting schedule permits some skew in the distribution of bene-
fits away from short service workers to career workers, which is considered
a desirable goal to many employers and policymakers as long as the transfer
enhances productivity. Other attributes of a two- to six-year graded vesting
schedule include employers recouping some of the training costs, increased
portability when compared to the existing FRS's ten-year cliff vesting re-
quirement and lower relative costs (over immediate vesting).
Determining the optional DC plan's contribution rate, which is a m;yor
determinant of the DB/DC election (and drives the ultimate cost of pension
reform), is a final methodological issue that needs to be addressed prior to
presenting the DC benefit accruals. One avenue is to peg the DC gross con-
tribution rate to the FRS's DB normal cost in order to avoid the perception
of a two-tier benefit structure (especially for new FRS members who are ex-
pected to gravitate to the DC option). This has a precedent in Florida-the
contribution rates of the small optional DC plans for limited classes of FRS
employees have historically been set equal to the FRS's normal cost for over
a decade.
A number of ancillary issues impact the DC plan's contribution rate. As
noted above, the VAL Working Group pointed out the value of having all
public workers be covered by preretirement death and disability insurance.
Cost estimates ranged from 50 to 100 basis points-and if the upper bound
was deducted from the FRS's normal cost for the current fiscal year- the DC
contribution rate would have been 8.21 percent for regular class members.
Although one of the goals of Florida's VAL Working Group was to stabilize
normal costs, year-to-year variability is the norm, and if DC contribution
rates were not permanently pegged to the initial DB normal costs, future
DB normal costs changes would, of course, change future DC contribution
rates. An alternative method ofestablishing the DC contribution rate would
be to establish a target income replacement level for participants.
A final point impacting the DC contribution rate is the treatment of the
two offsets, which accompany the election (forfeitures and surplus gain).
Forfeitures arise from workers terminating employment prior to vesting. Al-
though the graded two- to six-year vesting schedule increases portability ap-
preciably when compared to the existing FRS vesting schedule, some short-
term FRS members will still walk away with either no, or partial, pension
benefits. Regular class forfeitures associated with a perfect choice mod-
eling perspective (the modeling assumptions are discussed in the foJIow-
ing section) were estimated to be fifty-five basis points as a share of salary,
while those associated with the imperfect choice model were estimated to be
thirty-three basis points (Table 2). A surplus gain (the difference in the actu-
arial liability and the accumulated benefit obligation) arises when vested
DB members elect the DC option. The DC offsets were not assumed to in-
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TABLE 2. Florida Public Pension Reform Option Cost Estimates: Regular Class
Members as a Percent of Total Payroll
Cost Change (%) Cumulative Cost Change (%)
1st year Long-term* 1st year Long-term*
Perfect clwice model
Optional DC Plan 0.38 1.55 0.38 1.55
Add two-to-six year graded
DB vesting 0.44 0.06 0.82 1.61
Add 3% terminated vested
indexation 0.67 0.08 1.49 1.69
Total Option Costs less
surplus gain amortized
over 30 years (0.23 percent) 1.26 1.46
Imperfect clwice model
Optional DC Plan -0.76 0.43 -0.76 0.43
Add two-to-six year graded
DB vesting -0.23 0.64 -0.21 0.64
Add 3% terminated vested
indexation 1.07 0.57 0.84 1.21
Total Option Costs less
surplus gain amortized
over 30 years (1.40 percent) -0.56 -0.19
Source: Authors' compilation of unpublished data for 1997-98 provided by Milliman and
Robertson, Inc. and Ennis. Knupp & Associates.
*Long-term is defined in the simulations as over a 30-year period.
crease the DC contribution rate but were used to lower total pension costs.
This analysis assumes that a desirable goal of pension reform is cost manage-
ment and that FRS members and beneficiaries will be held harmless. Given
these constraints, the goal of increasing the portability of pension benefits
will add to pension costs, and the DC offset was used to help push FRS pen-
sion reform toward cost neutrality. Issues surrounding the determination of
the DC contribution rate will likely be revisited prior to the next legislative
session.
Figure 3 summarizes DC and DB pension accruals under a dual choice
structure for Florida plans having the same graded two- to six-year vesting
schedules. The DC benefit accruals assume an annuity payout with a 3 per-
cent annual cost-of-living increase to facilitate comparison to the FRS bene-
fit structure and is one of a number of ways to present DB and DC benefit
accrual comparisons. The reformed DB pension accruals become more pro-
portional for shorter service workers than under the current FRS's ten-year
cliff vesting requirement because the accelerated vesting schedule elimi-
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Figure 3. Benefit accrual patterns for FRS and DC plans with graded 2-6-year vesting. Source: authors' compilations
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nates a portion of the forfeiture portability losses. But, as expected, career
workers are still better off under a DB plan while the benefit accruals for
shorter to intermediate-term workers remain higher under a DC option.
Protecting the purchasing power of FRS retirement benefits of vested
workers who left covered employment prior to the normal retirement age
of 62 is the last pension reform to be analyzed. DC plans, whose benefits
are based on lifetime earnings, are by design fully portable as long as invest-
ment returns outpace expected salary growth, but vested FRS workers who
terminate employment prior to age 62 suffer substantial portability losses.
The portability losses associated with the backloading of DB benefits can be
eliminated if the benefits of workers leaving FRS employment prior to the
normal retirement age are indexed to the plan's assumed salary increases
from the date of termination through age 62.15 While the Senate bill's 3 per-
cent index provision did not totally eliminate the backloaded portability
losses, it took a major step in addressing the needs of the more mobile seg-
ment of the FRS workforce. Cost and administrative ease were the primary
reasons for settling on a 3 percent benefit index. Secondly, an index below
the assumed rate of salary increase permits some transfer of benefits from
shorter service to career workers (as did the two-to-six year vesting sched-
ule). Finally, a 3 percent index is considered by some to be equitable (or
at least easily understandable) because it is the same annual cost-of-living
adjustment FRS beneficiaries receive.
Figure 4 depicts the benefit accrual patterns for an optional FRS DC plan
and a reformed DB plan with two- to six-year vesting and a 3 percent index
of terminated vested benefits (the same provisions contained in the Sen-
ate bill). When compared to a DB plan with no indexation (Figure 3), the
benefit accrual line shifts upward toward proportionality. The basic pattern
of the DC and DB benefit accruals do not change -longer service workers
are better served by a DB plan while shorter service workers receive higher
benefit accruals under a DC plan. The crossover point (the years of ser-
vice where a FRS member is indifferent between selecting the DB plan or
DC option) falls by approximately four years of service - from twenty-five to
twenty-one years.
Charting the benefits accrual line in this fashion (Figures 2 to 4) offers a
useful tool for analyzing pension reform issues, but it is only one of many
different perspectives. Focusing on years ofservice and accounting for entry
and termination ages permits us to focus on a measure of portability losses.
But by doing so, we are collapsing two key variables into the aggregate analy-
sis: mortality risk, and income (and its associated tax rate). Abstracting from
mortality risk misrepresents the benefit accruals by race and gender for indi-
viduals. The DB benefit accruals ofwhite females, for example, are expected
to greatly exceed those of black males for workers with equivalent average
final compensation and equal years of service. Finally, due to the progres-
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sive federal tax structure (and progressive nature of social security benefits),
the specific income level needs to be brought into any disposable income
analysis of the adequacy of an individual's retirement benefits.
The analysis presented here includes the aggregate effects of mortality
risk and income on benefit accruals, but these fields were not available at the
individual record level. Although the omission of these two fields does not
present much of a barrier to systemwide pension reform analysis, they are
key factors influencing individuals' DB/DC election and their retirement de-
cisions. Understanding the effects of these variables can be easily included
in the educational material provided workers, including that proposed in
Florida.
Option-Cost Estimates of Public
Pension Reform in Florida
Since Florida's pension reform plan will permit a voluntary election between
two alternative benefit structures, members who elect the DC option will
change the resulting demographic profile and long-term cost structure (nor-
mal cost) of the DB plan. Logically, employees will select the option that
they believe will maximize the future value of their pension benefits. To the
extent that employees succeed in making benefit-maximizing choices, the
total value provided to all FRS employees will be greater than in the two
alternative plans on a stand-alone basis; in general, more benefits translate
into higher costs. From the employer's perspective, this additional cost is
often referred to as adverse selection (or the option cost) for a dual choice
structure.
Currently the FRS relies on cross subsidies to control funding costs, like
most traditional DB plans. Nonvested workers and vested workers who leave
FRS employment prior to the normal retirement age of 62 subsidize career
workers, enabling those long-career workers to receive higher benefits with-
out increasing total plan costs. Under a choice-optional DC structure,
younger members who opt out of the DB into the more portable DC plan
will drive up the overall FRS retirement system costs. However, attempting
to predict how many people would elect which option is a difficult task. Un-
certainties surrounding workers' estimates ofwhat their FRS working tenure
and wage paths will be at the time of the plan election provides the greatest
obstacle to estimating options costs. Other factors that increase the diffi-
culty of costing the option include not knowing individual risk preferences,
investment return expectations, what value is placed on self-determination,
how much non-FRS savings people have, and mortality risk. Costs can be
controlled somewhat by, for instance, equalizing the DB and DC vesting
schedules, and offering a one-time, ninety-day irrevocable opt-out election.
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But economic fluctuations due to the business cycle provide a dynamic en-
vironment in which plans will be selected and costs will be determined.
To make progress on modeling the reform options we differentiate be-
tween two modeling perspectives, we seek to quantify recurring costs, which
can be objectively measured by assuming persons act in their own economic
self-interest and choose to elect the pension option that gives them the
greatest expected benefits at retirement. One approach assumes that FRS
members have perfect knowledge regarding how many years of FRS ser-
vice they will eventually attain and behave as income maximizers. This ap-
proach, which we dub the "perfect choice" costing model relies on a detailed
database of FRS plan members maintained by the state's actuarial consul-
tant, Milliman and Robertson, Inc. Under this scenario FRS members are
assumed to choose the pension option that affords them the greatest bene-
fit accruals. This model can also be used to relax certain assumptions, so as
to explore the evolution of option costs over time from alternative perspec-
tives.t6
It is also useful to examine possible costs using an "imperfect choice" ap-
proach, which assumes that employee choice across plans will neither be
perfect nor random. Specifically, half of the FRS members are assumed to
make the wrong choice when they elect a pension option, and this half is
assumed to be the 50 percent that will lose the least in absolute dollars. Two
wrong choices are available: people could elect to remain in the DB plan
though they would have been better offelecting the DC plan, and vice versa.
Assuming that half the members make a wrong election, and that this half
has the lowest accumulation of pension assets to lose, provides a conserva-
tive pension reform scoring perspective.
Unfortunately there is a dearth of data relating to the election rates as-
sociated with dual choice structures, especially for DB and DC plans offer-
ing equivalent portability provisions. A few cases suggest that opt-out rates
by DB-covered employees prove to be substantially below the DC election
rate for new employees. Only 10 percent of the existing FRS DB employees
at Daytona Beach Community College (Florida) facing a DC/DB election
selected an optional TIAA-CREF DC plan, while approximately 80 percent
of new employees elected the DC option (Shunk 1999). The same pattern
for new employees was observed at North Carolina State University over a
five-year period in the early 1990s when less than 20 percent of the new em-
ployees elected the state DB plan (Clark, Harper, and Pitts 1997). These data
are not directly applicable to modeling the FRS regular service class elec-
tion because the great majority of FRS workers do not face the uncertainties
of a forced tenure decision. However, model runs using FRS data reveal the
same election pattern - DC election rates were much lower for existing FRS
members than for new employees. A long-term time horizon (thirty years
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for the present simulations) offers a more realistic picture of option costs
to policymakers because most employees are treated as new, which reduces
the possibility of unpleasant cost surprises arising from faulty DC election
rate assumptions of existing members.
Table 2 summarizes the option cost estimates associated with the simu-
lated Florida pension reform for regular class service members, which com-
prise approximately 90 percent of FRS payroll. The estimates include
changes in FRS regular class normal costs (9.21 percent) and the cumulative
change in costs for regular class FRS members. Estimates are provided for
two time horizons: first-year option cost estimates (which are based on the
current FRS population), and the long-term impacts.
The evidence indicates that estimated costs for this form of pension re-
form vary widely, with an upper bound of long-term costs of146 basis points
under a perfect knowledge assumption, to a lower bound of near cost neu-
trality ifenough participants make a poor pension choice. No point estimate
can be released with an acceptable degree of certainty, since nonconvexi-
ties may be present in the models, making multiple equilibrium points pos-
sible. All that can be inferred is that the option costs will likely fall within
this range.J7 But it is possible to break out the long-term costs of pension re-
form. Under the perfect choice model, most of the new costs arise from the
introduction of the optional DC plan. If the existing FRS DB plan were not
reformed and workers had perfect knowledge, workers with up to twenty-
five years of service (the approximate crossover age) would receive greater
benefits under the DC plan due to its accelerated vesting and portability
provisions; this would increase employer pension costs by 155 basis points.
If DB pension reform is layered in by matching the DC plan's accelerated
two- to six-year vesting schedule and adding a three percent indexation of
the benefits of vested workers leaving covered employment prior to age 62,
the DB benefit reform costs add but fourteen basis points. This is largely
attributable to new costs associated with accelerated vesting and increased
portability, also accounted for in the optional DC plan. If FRS members are
modeled as making the wrong choices by not maximizing their pension ac-
cruals, the attribution analysis becomes more muddled and the total option
costs of Florida pension reform approach cost neutrality.
Conclusions and Implications
The subject of public pension reform has been a lively one in the Florida
legislature in recent years. The 1999 analysis of Florida's public pension
plan suggested that a lack of portability and self-determination were unde-
sirable for certain segments of the public workforce, mainly mobile work-
ers, younger workers and higher income workers. But other public sector
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workers prefer to be insulated from most investment risks and do not seem
to value employee participation in the FRS's investment decisions. Our ex-
amination of a possible reform of the FRS explored the cost implications of
permitting employees to select between either a DB or a DC plan.
The specific plan examined would offer a DC option to all FRS regu-
lar service class members, pegging the gross DC contribution rate to the
FRS's normal cost, and adopting a graded two- to six-year DC vesting sched-
ule. The Senate bill increased the portability of DB benefits by offering
the same accelerated vesting schedule, and by indexing the future pen-
sion benefits by 3 percent per year of vested FRS members who leave the
covered workforce prior to age 62. The Senate's bill would have allowed
all regular class members to select the plan that better matches their self-
determination/investment risk/portability loss profile without an element
of compromise.
Inevitably models of the cost impact of the proposed pension reform
legislation produce results subject to wide error. Using a range of behav-
ioral assumptions, offering this option was estimated to have costs ranging
from neutral, if enough workers made incorrect pension elections, to 1.46
percent of regular class payroll, if all workers had perfect knowledge con-
cerning their future career paths.
Future legislative sessions will certainly bring up public pension reform
again. Several questions are salient:
1. What is the most appropriate DC contribution rate?
2. Should the DC election be open to all FRS workers or just the regular
membership class?
3. Should limits be placed on lump-sum distributions?
4. What mechanism should be used for transfers of DB assets (if any) to
the optional DC plan?
5. Should vested FRS members who left covered employment prior to the
normal retirement age of 62 be included in the pension reforms, and
if not, should they be allowed to transfer the discounted value of their
FRS benefits into a qualified retirement savings vehicle?
6. Should the choice of moving from the FRS to the optional DC plan
be a one-time, ninety-day irrevocable decision, or should there be an
annual election window? 18
The fact that the FRS pension system has eliminated its unfunded liability
in recent years offers policymakers a unique opportunity to reform Florida's
public pension program. Should optional DC pension legislation be passed
that also brings about DB plan reform, it will afford all workers the opportu-
nity to select the pension option best suited to their investment preferences
and anticipated tenure. The retirement portion of the overall compensation
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package offered by FRS employers would then be highly competitive relative
to that offered in the private sector.
This paper reflects solely the views of the authors, and it is not necessarily
the official position of the Florida State Board of Administration.
Notes
1. The FRS is predominantly a defined benefit pension plan. Limited classes of
FRS members (State University System, Community College, and state senior man-
agement personnel) are allowed a one-time election into an optional defined con-
tribution retirement plan. The DB accrual rate for regular class service members
(which comprises approximately 90 percent of payroll) is 1.6 percent per year (in-
creasing after normal retirement age), and retirees receive an annual 3 percent cost-
of-living adjustment. The total compensation package includes pre-retirement death
and disability insurance and a retiree health insurance subsidy ($5 a month per year
ofvested service with a $150 per month cap), and an optional, 100 percent employee
contribution, deferred compensation plan. Although the deferred compensation
plan is a DC plan, it has the portability constraints associated with Section 457 plans.
A deferred retirement option plan (DROP) was establishedJuly 1998. The health in-
surance subsidy is not actuarially funded, and the DROP program is not addressed
in the current valuation.
2. The FRS's investment returns for state fiscal years 1995-96 through 1998-99
were 16.6 percent, 20.9 percent, 21.9 percent and 13.8 percent respectively, exceed-
ing the annualized 8 percent investment return assumption over this period. Since
1985, the State Board ofAdministration outperformed 94 percent of its peers-de-
fined as public plans having assets exceeding one billion dollars (Ennis, Knupp &
Associates 1999).
3. The Working Group was comprised of legislators, legislative staff, representa-
tives of FRS employers, staff of the Lieutenant governor and the Division of Retire-
ment, and the executive director of the State Board of Administration.
4. The Working Group's economic recommendations included continuing the in-
vestment return/discount rate 8.0 percent assumption and reducing the total salary
assumption to 6.25 percent (from 7.25 percent). The salary growth assumption in-
cludes a 3.5 percent inflation rate, a real wage (productivity) increase of 1.5 per-
cent, and an age-graded merit scale. Actuarial recommendations included amor-
tizing the impact of future plan benefit changes, assumption changes and funding
method changes separately within thirty years; amortizing the impact offuture actu-
arial gains and losses on a rolling 10 percent basis as a level dollar amount (except for
gains reserved for contribution rate stabilization); performing an experience study
every third year; and utilizing updated mortality tables. In addition, the group ex-
pressed clear support for the recognition of contribution rate stability as a public
policy goal, and formalized the actuarial assumptions and methods process (UAL
Working Group 1999).
5. During the 1998 legislative session, an optional DC retirement bill (HB4333)
open to all membership classes of the FRS was passed unanimously by the House
but died in the Senate. An optional DC retirement bill, a revision of HB4333 (the
portable retirement option or PRO), open only to school board employees (whose
payroll accounts for approximately 45 percent of the total FRS payroll), was circu-
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lated just prior to the opening of the 1999 legislative session. The Senate enhanced
the bill substantially by broadening it to the entire regular membership and subse-
quently adopting two DB pension reform amendments: graduated two- to six-year
vesting, and the indexation of the benefits of terminated vested FRS members at a
3 percent rate (CS/CS/SB356). The bill passed unanimously in the Senate, but died
on the final day of the legislative session in the House. Legislation was included
in the bill that set the FRS's contribution rates for fiscal year 1999-2000 (HB1883)
that directs the Appropriation Committees to review the benefit structure of the
FRS prior to the start of next year's legislative session (due February 2000). Pen-
sion reform issues will likely reemerge in 2000; see the Florida Legislature's website
<www.leg.state.fl.us/>.
6. Financial markets had been experiencing atypically high market returns long
before the FRS's existence. Annualized backcasted FRS returns, which reflect what
the historical performance would have been given the FRS's current asset class
weighting, averaged 10.8 percent over the 1952 through 1998 period. A case can
be made to begin a historical analysis as far back as possible, but the 1952 starting
point for the backcast is chosen for policy reasons. Foremost is that even though the
Federal Reserve System was established in 1913, the role of the Federal Reserve was
not clarified until Congress passed the Employment Act of 1946, and the operating
procedures of the Federal Reserve were changed many times over the ensuing de-
cades. Starting the historical analysis in 1946 would bias the fixed income returns,
however, because the Treasury and Federal Reserve artificially kept interest rates low
during World War II and its aftermath to aid in the financing of the war debt. The
independence of the Federal Reserve was not established until March 1951.
7. Last year's surplus also arose, in part, from the low inflationary backdrop which
held back actual salary increases to 4.9 percent, far below the last valuation's 7.25
percent assumed salary increase.
8. No portion of the excess returns (other than increasing the health insurance
subsidy and opening a deferred retirement option plan for a limited subset of the
FRS membership) has been used for benefit enhancements for broad classes of FRS
members. The accrual rate for regular class members remains at 1.6 percent per year
of service through 30 years and the FRS has not accelerated its 10-year vesting re-
quirement, or enhanced benefit portability. The Florida legislature appears to have
operated under the notion as if employers (taxpayers) have the right to all surplus
assets because they bear all of the investment risk. Although this may be a common
stance in traditional DB plans, it is not a universal interpretation. Bulow and Scholes
(1981), for example, present a case for employees and stockholders to share in the
ownership of corporate pension assets. Empirical evidence (cited below) supports
the view that DB employees bear part of the investment risk and should, therefore,
have a claim to share the surplus assets. The FRS's treatment of the independence
of the pension claims from the value of the pension assets has probably prevented
FRS workers from fully benefiting from the atypically high financial market returns
that have accompanied the bulk of their working careers.
9. Studies of financial market returns extending prior to 1952 indicate that recent
experience has been atypical (Bernstein 1997; Bogle 1991; Seigel 1992). Moreover,
long-term analyses of financial markets that attempt to normalize equity market re-
turns for cycles in valuations show that recent stellar performance has been driven by
investors' willingness to pay more for expected earnings. History indicates that this
cycle, too, will eventually ebb and act to depress intermediate-term equity market
returns. Finally, controlling for cycles in inflation over time (inflationary expecta-
tions have fallen dramatically since 1981) also leads one to conclude that expected
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returns on the FRS portfolio are likely to be well below historical backcasted results.
Normalizing equity returns for cyclical valuations is currently a mainstream financial
methodology, but its premise rests on a crucial assumption-the independence of
the total return residuals over the long-term analysis. Not only are a number of non-
contiguous market indices used in this type of analysis, implicit in the independence
assumption is that structural changes in the economy over the past two centuries,
including the increasing effectiveness ofmonetary and fiscal policy, do not influence
long-term financial market returns. Monetary policy has been refined substantially
since the post-World War II era, and has proven to be an effective buffer against
external shocks to the domestic economy.
10. The first of the Working Group's guiding principles for redesigning the retire-
ment program structure was: "Do no harm, i.e., current beneficiaries and members
cannot be penalized by any changes. Any voluntary election to change to a new plan
prospectively must be accompanied by detailed individual statements showing the
potential impact on both short-term and long-term benefits." (VAL Working Group
1999, p. 485).
11. Many have recognized these portability losses associated with backloaded DB
pension formulas; at the federal government level, the Departments of Treasury,
Labor, and the Congressional Budget Office have also examined equity issues as-
sociated with the favorable tax treatment afforded private sector DB pension plans
(President's Committee on Private Pensions 1965; Subcommittee on Private Pension
Plans, 1993; Congressional Budget Office 1987; Hay-Huggins 1988). Recommenda-
tions for reducing DB plan portability losses have included accelerating the maxi-
mum allowable vesting requirement (President's Committee on Corporate Pension
Funds 1965) and setting up a national pension clearinghouse, as is done in a num-
ber of industrialized countries (Hay-Huggins 1990; Turner and Watanabe 1995). A
national minimum DC pension to be paid entirely by employers, for all workers over
twenty-five years old having at least one year of service was recommended by the
President's Commission on Pension Policy (1981).
12. We note that investment risk may also influence wage growth and real benefit
accruals in DB plans. That is, higher employer DB contribution rates resulting from
poor investment returns have been found to negatively impact both wage and bene-
fit increases and ad hoc inflation adjustments (Hyatt and Pesando 1996; Allen, Clark
and McDermed 1992).
13. Older FRS members receive increased accruals for service beyond normal re-
tirement age and can elect to participate in a deferred retirement option plan.
14. Implicit long-term wage contract theories point to increased productivity, due
to the deferred compensation incentives associated with the backloading of DB
benefits that reduce labor turnover, thereby enhancing productive job matches.
Short-term auction market theories, however, view the labor market from a totally
different perspective. Here, the lack of DB portability reduces productivity because
labor market efficiency mandates minimizing the costs and barriers to job change
(Ross 1958; Choate and Linger 1986; Allen, Clark, and McDermed, 1993). Many
studies analyze the relationship between worker turnover and productivity; see Gust-
man and Mitchell (1992), Dorsey (1995), Gustman and Steinmeier (1995), and Dor-
sey, Cornwell, and Macpherson (1998).
15. A national DB pension clearinghouse, previously proposed by Congress and
established in a number of industrialized countries, would also facilitate this goal.
16. A two-track approach to estimating reform costs was taken. The state's actu-
arial consultant prepared estimates with the full valuation system used for regu-
lar biennial valuations of the FRS. Estimates were based on considering the actual
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and potential economic position of narrow classes ofemployees, defined by age and
sex. A second consulting actuary (Ennis, Knupp & Associates) used an independent
model and more aggregated Florida actuarial data to check the first estimates and
methods. Finally, both consulting actuaries provided sensitivity analysis of their esti-
mates under varying actuarial assumptions and combinations of potential reforms.
This final step provided considerable insight into the impact of certain assumptions
and helped to refine the methods for estimating cost impacts.
17. A wide range of option costs associated with Florida pension reform was also
recognized by the state's actuary, Milliman and Robertson, Inc., in its November
1998 special study ofalternative DC legislation (Milliman and Robertson 1998b) and
subsequent analysis focusing more on the likelihood of adverse selection.
18. Due the backloading of DB benefits, an election into a DC plan should be con-
sidered irrevocable because of the substantial costs associated with reentering a DB
plan late in one's working career.
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